



TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP68R00530A000100120002-2  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CM-924-65  
23 October 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Intelligence Collection ☐

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1. ☐ One of the most serious limitations associated with the SAM problem in North Vietnam has been the very limited intelligence collection capability in that country. We have no firm evidential basis on which to determine the number of SAM units in North Vietnam, how they got there, or where the units or their support are located.

2. ☐ Informal presentations on current US collection capabilities using in-country assets have been given to the Director of the JCS Prong Tong Study Group by representatives from CIA, SACSA, and CINCPAC. This group was commissioned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine the SAM problem in North Vietnam and identify elements of concepts that would permit US air operations anywhere in that country without inhibitive SAM interference. In summary, it was stated that there is no capability to provide the kinds of information needed, nor does it seem likely that the present program involving in-country teams will be able to improve the situation.

3. ☐ As previously discussed, this information is needed on a high-priority basis, now and in the future. I hope that every attempt will be made to obtain it even though it may require reorganizing and realigning our activities.

JCS review(s)  
completed.

⑤ 10/26/65

Note action is SAVA per  
backlog from H Kwoche. P.D.

*Earle G. Wheeler*

EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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